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NOTES AND COMMENTS

amendment to the United States Arbitration Act extending it to embrace
written agreements to arbitrate labor disputes would lead to settlement
24
of even more industrial disputes by peaceful arbitration.
LEROY

F.

FULLER.

Real Property-Deeds-Requisites to a Valid
Delivery in North Carolina
In the recent North Carolina case of Ballard v. Ballrd,' a grantor
drafted, signed, sealed, and registered an instrument which purported
to convey for a consideration a tract of land to the grantee (son of the
grantor), subject to a twenty-one year estate reserved by the grantor.
After the grantor's death, the widow, who hafd married the grantor
after the conveyance, filed a petition for dower claiming that the deed
was not delivered, and the Superior Court granted this petition, but the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that registration in
addition to a declaration by the grantor that he had conveyed to the
grantee was sufficient evidence of an effective delivery even though it
was not shown that the deed was ever physically transferred to the
grantee and though the grantor apparently retained possession of the
deed until his death. Although the holding of the instant case does not,
in itself, change the law on the subject of delivery, there were statements in the opinion indicating, perhaps, a relaxation of the former
requirements stated by the court in Gillespie v. Gillespie, where it said:
"Whether a deed has been delivered in the legal sense is not dependent
exclusively upon the question of its manual or physical transfer from the
grantor to the grantee but also upon the intent of the parties. Both the
delivery of the instrunent and the intention to deliver it are necessary
2
to a transmutation of title."
It is the purpose of this note to examine, in the light of past cases,
the three requirements of a valid delivery as enunciated by the court in
24 Such an amendment has been suggested for presentation to Congress. Sturges,
Proposed Amendment of the United States ArbitrationtAct, 6 ARm. J. 227 (1942).
It has been suggested that the same result could be reached by a court simply lim-

iting the common law rule of revocability to commercial disputes and, on the basis
of public policy, refusing to extend the rule into the field of labor disputes. Latter
v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945) ; Comment, Arbitration
of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678 (1948). There is very little possibility of the federal courts reaching this result, however, because of the existing
line of cases which have refused to make this distinction.
'Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 55 S. E. 2d 316 (1949). The court, however, held that the admission of incompetent testimony by the widow as to nondelivery of the deed under which the grantee claimed title was prejudicial error and
set aside the verdict and judgment since the witness did not show that she had
had an opportunity to acquire personal knowledge of the facts of delivery.
Italics
2 Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40, 41, 120 S. E. 822, 823 (1924).
added.
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the present case and to determine how these requirements might affect
the old law. In the instant case the court said:

"The requisites to the valid delivery of a deed are threefold.
They are: (1) An intention on the part of the grantor to give the
instrument legal effect according to its purport and tenor; (2)
the evidencing of such intention by some word or act disclosing
that the grantor has put the instrument beyond his legal control,
though not necessarily beyond his physical control; and (3) acquiescence by the grantee in such intention.""
First, there must be an intent on the part of the grantor to give the
instrument legal effect. The intention of the parties at the time is controlling as to whether there has been an effective delivery ;4 but intention
by the grantor has not in the past taken the place of a manual transfer5
nor is mere physical transfer without intent a valid delivery.0 A handing
over of the instrument to a third party for examination does not constitute an effective delivery, since the requisite intent for a valid delivery
is lacking. 7
Second, in order to constitute a valid delivery, there must be "the
evidencing of such intention by some word or act disclosing that the
grantor has put the instrument beyond his legal control, though not
'Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
added.

Italics

'Blades v. Wilmington Trust Co., 207 N. C. 771, 178 S. E. 565 (1935). In
Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217 (1916), the grantor was confined to
her bed and there was evidence tending to show that she was averse to executing
the deed, but was afraid to refuse to do so. It was held that the jury should
consider the question of whether the grantor had exercised her will and executed
the instrument with the intent that it should operate as her deed. In Gaylord v.
Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 233, 63 S. E. 1028, 1033 (1909), a grantor had prepared,
signed, and sealed an instrument and had given it to his brother for the purpose
of keeping the instrument until he should get his family affairs corrected. It was
held that manual delivery alone is not enough but that there must also be an intent
to deliver, the court saying: "And the authorities are uniformly to the effect that,
in order to be a valid delivery, the deed must pass from the possession and control
of the grantor to that of the grantee, or to someone for the grantee's use and
benefit, with the intent at the time that title should pass or the instrument become

effective as a conveyance."
'In Fortune v. Hunt, 149 N. C. 358, 360, 63 S. E. 82, 83 (1908), where the
grantor had given a deed to a third persons with instructions to have it delivered
in case of the grantor's death, but to retain it subject to the grantor's control until
the grantor's death, it was held that there was no delivery, the court saying: "The
intention of the grantor will not take the place of actual delivery, which is essential
to the validity of a deed."
o "There must not only be a physical delivery of a deed as the final act of
execution, but it must be accompanied by an intent of the grantor to perfect the
instrument." See Huddleston v. Hardy, 164 N. C. 210, 214, 80 S. E. 158, 160
(1913), (concurring opinion).
'Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (1909); in Tarlton v.
Griggs, 131 N. C. 216, 221, 42 S. E. 591, 593 (1902), a deed by the grantor was
given to a third person to hold until certain other deeds should be executed by the
grantor; the grantees took possession of the deeds, and the court in holding no
delivery said: "There must be an intention of the grantor to pass the deed from
his possession and beyond his control. . . .
Both the intent and the act are
necessary to the valid delivery."
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necessarily beyond his physical control. '3 These words taken in their
context might appear to mean that intention alone, evidenced by some
word or act, is sufficient for a valid delivery. If so, the court has relaxed the requirement of a manual transfer of the instrument in addition to intention to make the deed effective. However, some of the
cases cited in support of the court's statement seem to hold that both
the intent and the ceremonial passing on of the deed itself are essential
to its validity.9 Also, there is a statement in the case which reads:
"But manual possession of the instrument is not essential to delivery.
It is sufficient if the grantor delivers the writing to some third person
for the grantee's benefit." 10 The first sentence taken alone would seem
to bear out the suggested interpretation, but a perusal of the cases cited
demonstrates that the first sentence cannot be supported, by itself, but
must be read in conjunction with the latter sentence.
The expression "delivery," as applied to written instruments, had
its beginning in connection with written conveyances of land, and the
manual transfer of the instrument in early times was regarded as the
symbolical transfer of the land itself, analogous to livery of seisin. The
notion of physically giving the instrument to the grantee applied also
in connection with written contracts, the manual transfer of the document being necessary to make it legally operative and effective. While
delivery is still required in connection with negotiable and other instruments of an analogous character, the old conception of a manual transfer
of the instrument as the only means of making it legally operative has
been superseded in most instances by the modem view that delivery is
merely a question of intention supplemented by some manifestation of
that intention."
In North Carolina, however, insofar as deeds are concerned, the
court has in the past spoken as though a physical changing of possession
of the 'deed were indispensable to an effectual delivery. In some North
Carolina cases, holding that there was no delivery, the want of a physical transfer of the deed seems unduly emphasized in the face of quite
convincing evidence of the intention of both the grantor and the grantee
that the deed should become effective. In a recent case, 12 omitted from
the cases cited by the court in the case at bar, a grantor placed the deed
in his Bible on the dresser in his bedroom. He told his daughter, one
of the witnesses, where he was putting the deed and instructed her to
Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949). Italics
added.
'Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C.40, 120 S. E. 822 (1924) ; Lee v. Parker, 171
8

N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217 (1916).
Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
Tiffany, Real Property, §1033 (3rd ed. 1939).
'= Barnes v. Aycock, 219 N. C. 360, 362, 13 S. E. 2d 611, 612 (1941).
Compare
Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N. C. 216, 221, 42 S.E. 591, 593 (1902).
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tell the grantee where it was and to have it recorded, but this message
was not delivered. The deed remained in the Bible and never came
into the possession of the grantee or anyone for her. It was held that
there was no delivery in spite of the fact that the grantor had expressed
an intention of giving the land to the grantee and the grantee had had
control of the land until the grantor's death. The court said: "To constitute delivery the papers must be put out of the possession of the
maker."
In another North Carolina case, 18 deeds were placed in a lock box
in a bank with the intention that they should convey to the grantor's
children certain land which the grantor owned. The deeds were found
after the grantor's death with the names of each of the grantees on
them, and although the grantor devised all his land except that which
he had purported and intended to convey by the deeds, it was held that
there was no delivery since the grantor did not relinquish control of the
instruments. In a Pennsylvania case,1 4 the grantor put a deed in a
safe among his other papers with the intention that the same should
be a delivery and later made oral declarations of that intention. It was
there held that there was a valid delivery of the deed. A distinguishing
feature was the fact that in the latter case, the grantee had access to the
safe, but the court indicated that that consideration was not controlling.
In the instant case it was pointed out that there is a presumption of
delivery of a deed arising from its registration, 15 but such presumption
is subject to rebuttal. 16 It has been held that where a deed is delivered
by the grantor to a- Register of Deeds, or even to his deputy clerk, to
have it registered with the intent that title should pass, there is a sufficient delivery even though the deed is not registered ;17 but where a
deed is registered for fear that it might be destroyed, and not with the
intention that it should then become a deed, such evidence is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of delivery arising out of registration.' 8 As
was held in the present case, however, mere possession of the deed by
the grantor after it has been recorded is not entitled to much consideration in rebutting the presumption of delivery, especially in view of the
fact that the grantor reserved an estate for a term of years.1 9
13 Thomas v. Conyers, 198 N. C. 229, 151 S. E. 270 (1930).
Kanawell v. Miller, 262 Pa. 9, 104 Atl. 861 (1918)
Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
"Federal
Land Bank of Columbia v. Griffin, 207 N. C. 265, 176 S. E. 555
(1934).
"1In Robbins v. Rascoe, 120 N. C. 80, 26 S. E. 807 (1897), where an instrument was delivered by the grantor to a deputy clerk with instructions to have it
14

registered before the clerk, who was then absent, the court held the delivery was
complete and valid, and the grantor could not afterwards take the deed back
from the deputy clerk even though the grantee did not at that time know of the
conveyance and the clerk had not then registered the deed.
" Ellington v. Currie, 40 N. C. 21 (1847).
19 Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
See
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It was pointed out in the case at bar that delivery made to a third
person is effectual to transfer title,20 and this is so even if the third
person is a stranger.21 When the maker delivers a deed to a third
person for the grantee, parting with the possession of it without any
condition as to how the third party shall hold it, the delivery is complete and title passes at once, though the grantee be ignorant of the
facts, and neither the grantor nor anyone else can later defeat such a
22
delivery.
The present case indicates that mere possession by the grantor of
the deed is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a valid delivery
arising from the registration of the deed by the grantor. 23 Further, it
has been held that a deed delivered to a grantee by a grantor, but afterwards placed with a third party for safekeeping until they should both
call for it is a good delivery and not an escrow.24 Where a deed is
executed and witnessed, and left on a table with both the grantor and
grantee present, a presumption of delivery arises, 25 notwithstanding
26
cases that hold contra when only the grantor is present.
The third requisite of a valid lelivery as enunciated by the court in
27
the instant case is "acquiescence by the grantee in such intention,"
i.e., by acceptance. Acceptance does not ordinarily constitute a problem in delivery, inasmuch as a grantee is presumed to accept provided
the conveyance is for the grantee's benefit. The presumption is not
that he will accept, but that he does accept,28 and such acceptance is
29
effectual until a contrary intent is shown.

In spite of the statements and the cases cited in the instant case,

which apparently indicate a contrary view, it is to be hoped that the
second requirement promulgated by the court has changed North Caroalso Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N. C. 429, 127 S. E. 346 (1925) ; Phifer v. Mullis,
167 N. C. 405, 83 S. E. 582 (1914); Helms v. Austine, 116 N. C. 751, 21 S. E.

556 (1895).
"OBallard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).

"Wesson v. Stephens, 37 N. C. 557 (1843).
"In Buchanan v. Clark, 164 N. C. 56, 80 S. E. 424 (1913), a father pur-

chased lands and had a conveyance made to his illegitimate son, without the son's
knowledge, and the son died before the instrument was sent to him, the conveyance was held to be good notwithstanding the father's attempt to obtain a second
conveyance from the original grantor himself. In Hall v. Harris, 40 N. C. 303
(1848), a paper was signed, sealed, and handed to a third person, to be delivered
to the grantee on a condition which the grantee afterwards complied with, the
delivery of the paper was held to be effective and complete and the deed took
effect at the time of the original transfer.
" Perkins v. Thompson, 123 N. C. 175, 31 S. E. 387 (1898); Williams v.
Springs, 29 N. C. 384 (1847).
2 Gibson v. Partee, 19 N. C. 530 (1837).
" Levister v. Hilliard, 57 N. C. 12 (1858).
"Baldwin v. Maultsby, 27 N. C. 505 (1845) ; Kirk v. Turner, 16 N. C. 14
(1826).
'*Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 633, 55 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1949).
"Henry v. Heggie, 163 N. C. 523, 79 S. E. 982 (1913).
"Smith v. Moore, 149 N. C. 185, 62 S. E. 892 (1908).
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lina's obsolete view of "delivery," that in addition to intention there
must be a manual transfer of the instrument itself. If such is not the
case, certainly there is the possibility that the court in future cases may
use this well-considered statement as a springboard toward the modern
and majority view that delivery is merely a question of intention to
give the deed legal effect evidenced by some word or act indicating
such an intention." °
GEORGE J. RABiL.
Taxation-Effect of Renunciation on the Taxability of
Property Subject to Power of Appointment
In order to minimize the estate tax on the passing of property many
a testator devises his property to his wife or child for life, giving the
devisee the power to appoint by will the ultimate taker of the property.
Usually he also provides that in the event of the failure of the donee of
the power of appointment to exercise this power, the property, at the
death of the donee, will go to a specified beneficiary. Whether or not
the property subject to the power is taxable in the donee's estate where
the appointee is also a taker in default has been the subject of much
litigation and of endless legal writings.'
Early in the line of cases, New York declared that where the appointee took a one-fourth interest in an estate under the exercise of a
power of appointment instead of the one-seventh interest which would
have been his had the power not been exercised, the entire amount was
taxable in the estate of the donee.2 Then, in 1905, where the appointee
had renounced all rights under the exercise of the power, the same court
declared that an interest given in default of appointment vested at the
death of the donor of the power, and that since the appointee would
take the same interest under the power as was already vested in her in
default, the interest was not taxable in the donee's estate.8 Much later
"Tiffany, Real Property, §1033 (3rd ed. 1939).
' 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §9.01 et seq. (1942); Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes: I, II, 52 YALE L. J. 296, 494
(1943) (contains a good collection of legal articles).
'In re Potter's Estate, 51 App. Div. 212, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1900); In re
Chauncey's Estate, 102 Misc. 378, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (1918) (the appointee
filed a conditional election whereby she desired to take under the instrument which
gave her the larger amount) ; In re Taylor's Estate, 209 App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 367 (1922) (the appointee could not claim part under the donor's will and
the excess under that of the donee) ; see It re Delano's Estate, 176 N. Y. 486,
68 N. E. 871 (1903).

Contra: 3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY §369(c)

(1940)

("if

the total property passing to such appointee differs from his interest in default of
appointment only in that it is a larger fractional interest in the ... thing covered
by the power, the property passes . . . in default of appointment so far as the
appointed interest is identical to the interest in default.").
'In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). But cf. In re
Cooksey's Estate, 182 N. Y. 92, 74 N. E. 880 (1905) where the court held the
interests taxable because the donor's will did not allow any default interest to
vest unless and until the donee died without exercising the power.

